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Fugitive safe surrender is a program of the United States Marshals Ser-
vice, in partnership with public, private, and faith-based organizations, 
which temporarily transforms a church into a courthouse, so fugitives 
can turn themselves in, in an atmosphere where they feel more comfortable to 
do so, and have nonviolent cases adjudicated immediately.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to bolster public safety and capture fugitives, U.S. 
Marshal for the Northern District of Ohio Peter Elliot created an in-
novative program called Fugitive Safe Surrender.2  This program 
“temporarily transforms a church into a courthouse, so fugitives can 
turn themselves in, in an atmosphere where they feel more comfort-
able to do so.”3  Elliot thought that fugitives would feel more com-
fortable surrendering at a church because it provides a safe environ-
 ∗ J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.S., 2005, University of Pitts-
burgh; B.A., 2002, Pennsylvania State University.  I would like to thank my faculty ad-
visor, Professor Thomas Healy, for his tremendous help with this Comment.  I would 
also like thank my parents, Susan and Fred Gruen, and my sister, Amy Gruen, for 
their love and support.  Finally, I would like to thank Alison Young for her patience, 
support, and love. 
 1 Fugitive Safe Surrender Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 2 Press Release, U.S. Marshals Service, Cleveland U.S. Marshal Named “Top 
Cop” of the United States (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/ 
news/chron/2007/032807.htm [hereinafter March 28, 2007, U.S. Marshals Press Re-
lease]; see also U.S. Marshals Service, Fugitive Safe Surrender, http://www 
.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 
Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview]. 
 3 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1). 
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ment that is not associated with violence.4  The pilot program in 
Cleveland, Ohio, produced successful results, as over 800 fugitives 
surrendered over a four-day period.5  Based on the pilot program’s 
success, the U.S. Marshals Service revealed its plan to implement the 
program nationally,6 and identical bills were introduced into the 
House and Senate to provide federal funding for this innovative pro-
gram.7  The bills were passed as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protec-
tion and Safety Act and provided federal funding to the U.S. Marshals 
Service for any state implementing the program between 2007 and 
2009.8
While the goal of the program is commendable, it raises serious 
issues under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 
which prohibits Congress from making any law that respects an estab-
lishment of religion.9  The program is constitutionally suspect be-
cause it does not adhere to the separation of church and state doc-
trine. 
The Supreme Court first examined separation of church and 
state in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing10 and em-
braced strict separation of the two.  Justice Black, writing for the ma-
jority, explained, 
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can 
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief 
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or 
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be lev-
ied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or prac-
 4 Phil Trexler, Inspiration Delivers Fugitives to Church: U.S. Marshal Gets Idea for Sur-
render Program, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL (Ohio), Apr. 2, 2007, at AK-0402. 
 5 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fugitive Safe Surrender Succeeds (Aug. 8, 
2005), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/district/oh-n/news/chron/2005/ 
080805.htm [hereinafter Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release]. 
 6 U.S. Marshals Service, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion, 
http://www.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/expansion.html (last visited Mar. 7, 
2008) [hereinafter Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion]. 
 7 H.R. 5459, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2570, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 8 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 632, 120 
Stat. 587, 641–42 (2006) (Fugitive Safe Surrender Act codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989 
(West Supp. 2007)). 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 10 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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tice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, 
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious or-
ganizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the 
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect “a wall of separation between church and State.”11
Over the past sixty years, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
evolved and become increasingly complex.12  However, the Supreme 
Court has provided guidelines for analyzing claims of Establishment 
Clause violations in the form of three tests: the Lemon test,13 the en-
dorsement test,14 and the coercion test.15
This Comment argues that Fugitive Safe Surrender violates the 
Establishment Clause under current jurisprudence and that the pro-
gram should be offered in a non-sectarian environment so that its 
tremendous benefits may be obtained through constitutional means.  
Part II discusses the creation and funding of the program, its imple-
mentation in two different cities, and President Bush’s faith-based ini-
tiative, which demonstrates his desire to allow programs of this na-
ture.  Part III discusses the three main tests under Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence and analyzes Fugitive Safe Surrender according 
to those tests.  Additionally, Part III discusses how those tests have 
evolved and the role of public policy in Establishment Clause deci-
sions.  Finally, Part IV proposes reform for the program with an eye 
toward maintaining separation of church and state. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE FUGITIVE 
SAFE SURRENDER PROGRAM 
The concept of the church as a refuge for fugitives is not new.  
Historically, sanctuaries served as places of refuge where fugitives 
were safe from the penalties of the law.16  This concept was so ac-
cepted that it was considered sacrilegious to commence violence in 
these safe havens or to forcibly remove an individual from them.17  In 
 11 Id. at 15–16 (citation omitted). 
 12 The split decisions in most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with Estab-
lishment Clause violations demonstrate the different views held by the Justices.  See 
generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793 (2000).  In addition, these cases demonstrate that no test or factor has been es-
tablished as the sole test to use in Establishment Clause cases but instead that several 
considerations are considered under many levels of different tests. 
 13 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 14 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
 15 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 16 THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2501 (6th ed. 2007). 
 17 Id. 
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Egypt and Greece, temples enjoyed this hallowed status, and in 
Rome, Christian churches were chosen as sanctuaries by Constantine 
I.18  In medieval law, churches maintained sanctuary status, and felons 
obtained a religious right of asylum should they safely reach such a 
destination.19  English law recognized churches and temples as sanc-
tuaries from the Fourth to the Seventeenth century, and once inside, 
fugitives enjoyed the right to be safe from arrest.20  When abuses of 
sanctuaries began to encourage crime, the notion of a safe haven was 
abolished, and modern penal codes no longer recognize this right to 
asylum for fugitives.21
Today, the concept of the church as a sanctuary has resurfaced 
in the form of the Fugitive Safe Surrender program, created by Peter 
Elliot, U.S. Marshal for the Northern District of Ohio.22  The U.S. 
Marshals Service intends to implement the program nationally by 
2009.23  The program “temporarily transforms a church into a court-
house”24 by placing state judges in churches to adjudicate non-violent 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 March 28, 2007, U.S. Marshals Press Release, supra note 2. 
 23 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(4), (c) (West Supp. 2007). 
 24 The Fugitive Safe Surrender Act reads in full: 
(a) Findings. Congress finds the following: 
(1) Fugitive Safe Surrender is a program of the United States 
Marshals Service, in partnership with public, private, and faith-
based organizations, which temporarily transforms a church into 
a courthouse, so fugitives can turn themselves in, in an atmos-
phere where they feel more comfortable to do so, and have 
nonviolent cases adjudicated immediately. 
(2) In the 4-day pilot program in Cleveland, Ohio, over 800 fu-
gitives turned themselves in. By contrast, a successful Fugitive 
Task Force sweep, conducted for 3 days after Fugitive Safe Sur-
render, resulted in the arrest of 65 individuals. 
(3) Fugitive Safe Surrender is safer for defendants, law en-
forcement, and innocent bystanders than needing to conduct a 
sweep.  
(4) Based upon the success of the pilot program, Fugitive Safe 
Surrender should be expanded to other cities throughout the 
United States. 
(b) Establishment. The United States Marshals Service shall establish, 
direct, and coordinate a program (to be known as the “Fugitive Safe 
Surrender Program”), under which the United States Marshals Service 
shall apprehend Federal, State, and local fugitives in a safe, secure, and 
peaceful manner to be coordinated with law enforcement and com-
munity leaders in designated cities throughout the United States. 
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cases in which the fugitives have no history of violence.25  Elliot and 
other promoters of the program, such as U.S. Marshal for Arizona 
David Gonzales, emphatically claim that the program is not an am-
nesty program.26  However, the fugitives do receive “favorable consid-
eration” for surrendering.27  This includes release without bail, 
quashed warrants, and lesser penalties at sentencing.28  The adjudica-
tion that takes place at the church includes meeting with judges, pub-
lic defenders, and prosecutors; conducting arraignments, plea 
agreements, and bond hearings; and setting dates for sentencing.29  
Finally, some of the programs have involved the use of priests acting 
as advocates for the fugitives.30
Elliot believes this program will benefit both the fugitives and 
the community by providing an environment where fugitives feel 
comfortable surrendering and by keeping fugitive arrests off the 
streets.31  In a recent interview, Elliot stressed the effectiveness of 
comfort and trust as motivating factors for surrendering: 
I’ve been in law enforcement 24 years and I didn’t feel the com-
munity trusted police for the most part.  I felt the community 
(c) Authorization of Appropriations. There are authorized to be ap-
propriated to the United States Marshals Service to carry out this sec-
tion-- 
(1) $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2007; 
(2) $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; and 
(3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2009. 
(d) Other Existing Applicable Law. Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to limit any existing authority under any other provision of 
Federal or State law for law enforcement agencies to locate or appre-
hend fugitives through task forces or any other means. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 16989. 
 25 See Troy Graham, High Court Blocks Plan for Camden Fugitives: The Chief Justice, 
Citing Credibility and Safety, Won’t Let Judges Take Part in a Program for Criminals to Sur-
render in a Church, PHIL. INQ., Jul. 18, 2006, at B1. 
 26 Dennis Wagner & Lindsey Collom, Fugitives Answer Call to Surrender: Program 
Gives Suspects Chance for “Favorable Consideration”, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2006, at 3A. 
 27 U.S. Marshals, Fugitive Safe Surrender, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) [he-
reinafter Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ]. 
 28 See Dennis Wagner, Arizona Fugitives Will Get to Surrender—In Church, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2006, at 1A; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26; WKYC News, Fugi-
tive Safe Surrender: 33-Year-Old Man Becomes First to Turn Himself In (July 25, 
2005), http://www.wkyc.com/news/news_fullstory.asp?id=38380. 
 29 See Wagner, supra note 28; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26; WKYC News, supra 
note 28. 
 30 See Dick Russ, WKYC News, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Fugitives on Run Given 
Chance to Peacefully Turn Themselves In (July 23, 2005), http://www.wkyc.com/ 
news/news_fullstory.asp?id=38311. 
 31 Trexler, supra note 4. 
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trusted their minister the most.  The minister is the one who is 
there at birth, at marriages and at burials.  They’re with the peo-
ple every day, building trust.  So I thought we could bring the 
whole justice center and put it in a church and let the minister be 
the advocate for the program and allow these people to surrender 
in a comfortable environment.32
Several cities have already completed the four-day program, in-
cluding Cleveland, Ohio (pilot program); Phoenix, Arizona; Wash-
ington, D.C.; Indianapolis, Indiana; Akron, Ohio; Memphis, Tennes-
see; and Nashville, Tennessee.33  In addition, many other cities have 
indicated their desire to launch the program in the near future, in-
cluding Atlanta, Georgia; Camden, New Jersey;34 Columbia, South 
Carolina; Dallas, Texas; Detroit, Michigan; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 
Scranton, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia; Rochester, New York; 
and Syracuse, New York.35
A. Fugitive Safe Surrender Legislation 
Congresswoman Stephanie Tubbs Jones (Ohio) and Senator 
Mike DeWine (Ohio) introduced identical bills into the House and 
Senate to authorize funding for the program.36  President Bush 
signed the bill into law on July 27, 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act.37  The bill allocates federal funding 
to the U.S. Marshals Service in cities implementing the Fugitive Safe 
Surrender program and provides $3 million for fiscal year 2007, $5 
million for fiscal year 2008, and $8 million for fiscal year 2009.38  The 
 32 Id. 
 33 Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2. 
 34 Deborah Poritz, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, ve-
hemently opposed the program and refused to allow state judges to participate in it.  
See Graham, supra note 25.  The program relies on participation by state judges be-
cause the fugitives involved have outstanding warrants issued by the state for state 
crimes.  See id.  Poritz expressed two main concerns about the program: separation of 
church and state and neutrality.  Id.  She was primarily concerned with what she be-
lieved to be a disregard for separation of church and state.  Id.  Secondarily, she as-
serted the importance of neutrality for courts and that participation by state judges 
would seem like the courts were working for law enforcement and the prosecution.  
Id. 
 35 Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion, supra note 6. 
 36 H.R. 5459, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2570, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 37 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 632, 120 
Stat. 587, 641–42 (2006) (Fugitive Safe Surrender Act codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989 
(West Supp. 2007)). 
 38 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2007). 
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bill also states that the program should expand and eventually be-
come a national program.39
Remarkably, the plain language of the bill, which entangles law 
enforcement efforts, judicial responsibilities, and churches, reads: 
(a) Findings. Congress finds the following: 
(1) Fugitive Safe Surrender is a program of the United 
States Marshals Service, in partnership with public, private, 
and faith-based organizations, which temporarily transforms 
a church into a courthouse, so fugitives can turn themselves 
in, in an atmosphere where they feel more comfortable to 
do so, and have nonviolent cases adjudicated immediately.40
The program has received tremendous support in general,41 and 
the bill easily passed in both the House and the Senate.42
B. The Fugitive Safe Surrender Programs in Cleveland and Phoenix43
Mount Sinai Baptist Church in Cleveland, Ohio, was the site for 
the pilot of Fugitive Safe Surrender.44  On August 3–6, 2005, fugitives 
were encouraged to voluntarily surrender themselves at church with a 
rare opportunity to receive a “first and most crucial step toward 
community re-entry.”45  Radio, television, and outdoor companies 
provided billboard space and airtime to promote the program and to 
inform fugitives about the opportunity.46  In addition, volunteers 
posted and distributed more than three thousand fliers in the target 
area and sent over two thousand mailers to fugitives’ last known ad-
dresses.47  Fugitives and their families could also call a toll-free hot-
 39 Id. § 16989(a)(4). 
 40 Id. § 16989(a)(1). 
 41 See Bruce Wilson, New National Program to “Temporarily Transform Churches 
into Courthouses,” Talk to Action (Oct. 29, 2006), http://www.talk2action.org/story/ 
2006/10/29/05334/588 (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). 
 42 Tubbs Jones Announces Passage of Fugitive Safe Surrender Act as Part of Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 15, 2006. 
 43 Cleveland and Phoenix were the sites for the first two programs.  See U.S. Mar-
shals, Fugitive Safe Surrender, Phoenix, Arizona, http://www.usmarshals.gov/ 
safesurrender/phoenix.htm (last visited March 13, 2008). 
 44 See Kristin Anderson, WKYC News, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Cleveland Church 
Gets Ready to Become Courtroom (July 24, 2005), http://www.wkyc.com/news/ 
news_fullstory.asp?id=38349. 
 45 Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2. 
 46 Press Release, U.S. Marshals Service, First-of-Its-Kind Program Gives Felony Fu-
gitives Incentive to Surrender (July 26, 2005), available at http://www.usmarshals 
.gov/district/oh-n/news/chron/2005/072605.htm. 
 47 Id. 
GRUEN (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:43:58 PM 
1540 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1533 
 
line for more information.48  Promoters advertised the program as a 
community re-entry opportunity mainly for felons that had no history 
of violence.49  While indicating that the program was not an amnesty 
program, promotions and advertisements stated that the fugitives 
who participated would receive “favorable consideration” for taking 
advantage of the voluntary surrender opportunity and that the 
church was a safe place for these fugitives to surrender.50
One of the fugitives who participated was a thirty-three-year-old 
man whose case was heard in the pastor’s office by Judge Janet Burn-
side.51  Judge Burnside provided favorable consideration by dropping 
one felony charge in exchange for a guilty plea to a different felony 
charge.52  The judge released the man on his signature and sched-
uled sentencing for the following month.53
Public defenders assisted those who showed up at the church, 
and non-profit organizations provided family counseling and child-
care services.54  A total of 842 fugitives surrendered during the four-
day pilot program, including 324 wanted for felony crimes.55  Al-
though the program targeted felons wanted for nonviolent crimes 
with no history of violence, it provided assistance to anyone with an 
outstanding warrant.56  The city planned a fugitive sweep to com-
mence immediately following termination of the pilot program, with 
the intention of capturing fugitives choosing not to participate in the 
program.57  The city would not provide favorable consideration to the 
fugitives captured by the sweep the way it did to those taking advan-
tage of the program.58  The success of the pilot program led the U.S. 
Marshals Service to announce its goal to implement the program na-
tionally.59
Pilgrim Rest Baptist Church, in Phoenix, Arizona, was the site 
for the next launch of Fugitive Safe Surrender on November 15–18, 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 WKYC News, supra note 28. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Wagner, supra note 28. 
 55 Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release, supra note 5. 
 56 See Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2; Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press 
Release, supra note 5. 
 57 Anderson, supra note 44. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Fugitive Safe Surrender: Future Expansion, supra note 6. 
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2006.60  Promoters advertised the Phoenix program the same way as 
the Cleveland pilot program and also aired public service an-
nouncements featuring NBA star Shaquille O’Neal and Arizona Re-
publican Senators John McCain and Jon Kyl.61  Again, fugitives who 
surrendered met with public defenders and Superior Court judges.62  
One hundred twenty fugitives surrendered during the first four hours 
of the program.63  These fugitives were wanted for crimes such as 
drunken driving, disorderly conduct, failure to pay fines, and proba-
tion violations.64  In all, 1300 fugitives surrendered during the four-
day program in Phoenix.65  U.S. Marshal for Arizona David Gonzales 
stated that fugitives would receive favorable consideration for partici-
pating, which “means they may be released without bail after appear-
ing at the church and may be given leniency later at sentencing.”66  
One of the fugitives in the Phoenix program was a thirty-two-year-old 
man wanted for DUI, probation violation, and failure to appear in 
court.67  He had one of his warrants quashed and was free to leave af-
ter the proceedings.68  The Phoenix program received a $600,000 
Federal Office of Justice Program grant for assembly and operation, 
but Gonzales only expected it to cost approximately $75,000.69  In an 
effort to publicize the program, the Maricopa County Superior Court 
issued an administrative order to allow more media coverage.70  The 
order lifted the forty-eight-hour advance notice requirement for 
submitting a video-camera-in-the-courtroom request for any proceed-
ing that was part of the Fugitive Safe Surrender Program.71
 60 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Over 1,300 Fugitives Surrender to U.S. 
Marshals at Church Site (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/ 
safesurrender/news/112106.htm [hereinafter Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release]. 
 61 Wagner, supra note 28. 
 62 Jerry Seper, 1,300 Fugitives Give Up in Phoenix: Operation Seeks to Reduce Risk, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2006, at A4; see also Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra 
note 60. 
 63 Wagner & Collom, supra note 26. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Seper, supra note 62. 
 66 Wagner, supra note 28. 
 67 Wagner & Collom, supra note 26. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 In the Matter of Cameras in Courtrooms for Fugitive Safe Surrender, Admin. 
Order No. 2006-130 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa 
.gov/SuperiorCourt/AdministrativeOrders/2006.asp. 
 71 Id. 
GRUEN (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:43:58 PM 
1542 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1533 
 
C. President Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative 
Debate over federal funding for programs taking place in reli-
gious institutions is nothing new.  Appropriation of federal funds for 
use in churches has steadily increased since President George W. 
Bush announced his faith-based initiative.  During the second week of 
his term, President Bush announced that promoting faith-based or-
ganizations would be one of his foremost legislative priorities.72
The relationship between government and faith-based organiza-
tions has always been delicate.  In 1996, Congress attempted to regu-
late this relationship by creating Charitable Choice.73  Charitable 
Choice was part of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 and was designed 
to place religious institutions on equal footing with nonreligious in-
stitutions regarding government funding for social services.74  In ad-
dition, Charitable Choice provided that faith-based organizations 
could not be required to alter their religious character in order to 
participate in government-funded programs.75
Bush’s faith-based initiative was his attempt to advance and en-
force Charitable Choice.76  Pursuant to his initiative, President Bush 
established the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives.77  The goal of the agency was to eliminate obstacles that 
faith-based organizations faced in receiving federal funding for the 
provision of social services.78  The agency succeeded in achieving its 
goal as the amount of federal funding to faith-based organizations in-
creased dramatically.79  Fugitive Safe Surrender requires that faith-
based organizations receive federal funding in order to provide social 
services to the fugitives who surrender.80  Therefore, this program 
falls under the umbrella of President Bush’s faith-based initiative. 
 72 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2 (2005); Jill Goldenziel, Note, Administratively Quirky, Constitution-
ally Murky: The Bush Faith-Based Initiative, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 361 
(2004). 
 73 Goldenziel, supra note 72, at 360 (citing Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000)). 
 74 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2000). 
 75 Goldenziel, supra note 72, at 361 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (2000)). 
 76 See Exec. Order No. 13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Goldenziel, supra note 72, at 364. 
 80 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007). 
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III. FUGITIVE SAFE SURRENDER UNDER  
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion . . . .”81  The Establishment 
Clause was intended to afford protection from three main concerns: 
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sover-
eign in religious activity.”82  While Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence has evolved and become increasingly ambiguous,83 courts still 
look at three tests as the guideposts in Establishment Clause cases:84 
the Lemon test,85 the endorsement test,86 and the coercion test.87  
Courts “are free to apply any or all of the three tests, and to invalidate 
any measure that fails any one of them.”88  Therefore, an analysis of 
Fugitive Safe Surrender under Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
must address these three tests. 
A. Lemon Test 
Despite heavy criticism, the Lemon test has never been overruled 
and has consistently been used as the appropriate starting point to 
analyze any program under the Establishment Clause.89  Most courts 
still use the Lemon test, or some variation of it, as the main test to de-
termine claims of Establishment Clause violations, particularly with 
cases involving federal aid to sectarian organizations for secular ser-
vices.90  The Lemon test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman,91 in which 
 81 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 82 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
 83 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 84 See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (analyzing 
principles from all three tests to invalidate the school district’s policy of permitting 
student led prayers before high school football games); Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 
F.3d 466, 485–87 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Lemon test, endorsement test, 
and coercion test are the three tests that the Supreme Court uses to analyze alleged 
Establishment Clause violations). 
 85 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 86 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 87 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 88 Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487. 
 89 See Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 90 See Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d 266, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2005); Mellen v. 
Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2003) (endorsing the Lemon test as the 
proper test for analyzing Establishment Clause issues, and incorporating the en-
dorsement and coercion tests into the Lemon test as part of the second prong analy-
sis); Gray v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 2d 795, 799 (W.D. Va. 2006). 
 91 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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the Supreme Court analyzed two state statutes that provided state aid 
to church-related elementary and secondary schools and teachers for 
secular instruction.92  The Rhode Island statute provided for annual 
salary supplements, up to fifteen percent, to teachers of secular sub-
jects in nonpublic elementary schools.93  The Pennsylvania statute 
provided for state reimbursement of nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary schools for costs of teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instruc-
tional materials in specified secular subjects.94  The Court in Lemon 
established a three-prong test to analyze Establishment Clause claims: 
the purpose prong, the effect prong, and the entanglement prong.95  
Violations of a single prong under the Lemon test means a govern-
ment action is unconstitutional.96
1. The Purpose Prong 
The first prong of the Lemon test, the purpose prong, mandates 
that the statute or program in question have a secular purpose.97  
This prong is not satisfied by the mere existence of a secular purpose 
if the program is dominated by religious purposes.98  Under the pur-
pose prong of the test, a court must ascertain “whether government’s 
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.”99  In order to 
determine the purpose of a program, and thus to determine its secu-
larity, courts look at the face of the statute at issue,100 as well as at the 
legislative history.101  As Justice O’Connor explained, courts look to 
the true governmental purpose, rather than just giving deference to a 
pretextual purpose.102  While Justice O’Connor recognized that “[i]t 
is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham secular 
purpose . . . . ,” she confidently proclaimed that “our courts are capa-
ble of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere  
one . . . .”103
 92 Id. at 607–11. 
 93 Id. at 607. 
 94 Id. at 609. 
 95 Id. at 612–13. 
 96 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (“State action violates the 
Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of [the Lemon] prongs.”). 
 97 Lemon, 403 U.S at 612. 
 98 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 
 99 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 100 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
 101 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 n.100 (1982). 
 102 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75–76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 103 Id. at 75. 
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Fugitive Safe Surrender is driven by a secular purpose: to pro-
vide fugitives a comfortable and safe place to surrender and to keep 
arrests off the streets.104  While the language on the face of the Act 
about transforming a church into a courthouse could intimate a reli-
gious purpose, the Act further states that its goal is to provide fugi-
tives with a comfortable atmosphere for surrender.105  Moreover, the 
thin legislative history includes a speech by Senator DeWine, which 
reinforces that the purpose of the program is to bolster public safety 
by motivating fugitives to submit and keeping fugitive arrests off of 
the streets.106  Thus, there is insufficient evidence to argue a sham 
purpose.  Therefore, the program does not violate the first prong of 
the Lemon test. 
2. The Effect Prong 
The second prong of the Lemon test, the effect prong, requires 
that the “principal or primary effect [of the program] . . . neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.”107  The inquiry is not whether the intent 
behind the program is to inhibit or advance religion, but whether the 
program has that effect regardless of intent.108
The effect prong of the Lemon test has evolved and emerged as 
the primary focus of cases involving governmental funding of secular 
services provided by sectarian organizations.109  In Agostini v. Felton,110 
the Court expanded the analysis under the effect prong of the Lemon 
test in order to analyze governmental aid that was given to sectarian 
schools.111  The Court also examined entanglement as part of this ex-
panded analysis, rather than considering it as an independent prong 
under the Lemon test.112  While the underlying question of the effect 
prong—whether religion is actually advanced or inhibited—remains 
fairly simple, Agostini made the framework much more complex by 
creating a new test subsumed within the effect prong of the Lemon 
test.113  The Agostini Court explained that, for determining whether 
 104 See Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2. 
 105 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007). 
 106 152 CONG. REC. S3231, 3231 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. De-
Wine). 
 107 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 108 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (internal quotations omitted). 
 109 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 
530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 110 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 111 Id. at 234–35. 
 112 Id. at 232–35. 
 113 Id. 
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governmental aid provided to sectarian organizations for secular ser-
vices has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, a court must 
use a three-part inquiry: whether the government aid (1) “result[s] in 
governmental indoctrination,” (2) “define[s] its recipients by refer-
ence to religion,” or (3) “create[s] an excessive entanglement.”114
a. Government Indoctrination 
Agostini’s first criterion, determining whether the government 
aid results in governmental indoctrination, is “a question whether any 
religious indoctrination that occurs . . . could reasonably be attrib-
uted to governmental action.”115  The Court places most of the em-
phasis on neutrality in its attempt to discern religious indoctrination 
that can be attributed to governmental action.116  The Court ex-
plained that “[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike 
eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoc-
trination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the 
behest of the government.”117  While acknowledging that neutrality is 
an integral part of the analysis under this first Agostini criterion, Jus-
tice O’Connor expressed her concern that the Court placed too 
much emphasis on this one factor, thus making it “a single and suffi-
cient test for the establishment constitutionality.”118  Even prior to 
Agostini, the Court began to lean heavily on the neutrality analysis, 
giving it more weight than other Establishment Clause concerns.119
As part of the neutrality analysis, a court should consider wheth-
er the government aid is provided to the sectarian organizations “as a 
 114 Id. at 234. 
 115 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 838 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 900 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing)). 
 119 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).  Bowen involved a claim that 
the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 597.  
The Act authorized grants to public and nonprofit private organizations, including 
religious organizations for services and research in the area of premarital adolescent 
sexual relations and pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-1–10 (1982).  The Court upheld 
the Act’s constitutionality, emphasizing its neutrality in including both religious and 
secular service providers.  Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602.  The focus of the Court’s neutrality 
analysis in this case was on the organizations that would receive the funds.  Id.  Board 
of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), involved 
a state law that carved out a separate school district to serve exclusively a community 
of highly religious Jews.  Again, the Court focused on neutrality in finding that the 
law violated the Establishment Clause partly because it singled out a particular reli-
gious sect for special treatment. Id. at 696.  This case focused on neutrality in terms 
of treating different religions equally.  Id. 
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result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individu-
als” ultimately receiving the benefit.120  Private choice “guarantee[s] 
neutrality by mitigating the preference for pre-existing recipients that 
is arguably inherent in any governmental aid program . . . .”121
Private choice was the primary focus of the Court’s analysis in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.122  That case involved a Cleveland school 
voucher program that gave financial assistance to families in Ohio 
school districts who wished to send their children to participating 
public or private schools, including religious schools.123  Ninety-six 
percent of the 3700 participating students enrolled in religious 
schools.124  The Court upheld the constitutionality of the program, 
considering the true private choices of citizens to be of primary im-
portance.125  The Court found that the federal funding was not sent 
directly to the schools themselves, but rather was granted to individ-
ual families, who then made the choice to send their children to reli-
gious schools.126  Therefore, the program allowed the students a pri-
vate choice, without regard to their religious beliefs and 
tendencies.127  The Court drew attention to the three previous cases 
in which claims of Establishment Clause violations were rejected pri-
marily on the basis of the true and independent private choices by 
the beneficiaries.128  These cases established that the proportion of 
 120 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997)); 
see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993) (holding that 
an interpreter provided by the government for a deaf child did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause despite the fact that the interpreter would be interpreting religious 
teachings because the material being interpreted was the truly private and inde-
pendent choice of the child). 
 121 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810. 
 122 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 123 Id. at 645–46. 
 124 Id. at 647. 
 125 Id. at 652. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649–53 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397–401 
(1983) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a Minnesota program au-
thorizing tax deductions for various educational expenses because public funds were 
made available to religious schools as a result of the truly private and independent 
choices of the parents, regardless of the fact that the vast majority of beneficiaries 
were parents of children in religious schools); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. 
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487–90 (1986) (rejecting an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to a vocational scholarship program that provided tuition aid to a student 
studying at a religious institution to become a pastor based on the independent pri-
vate choices that determined where the money went, and once again deeming the 
amount of government aid channeled to religious institutions by individual aid re-
cipients to be irrelevant); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8–12 
(1993) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal program that per-
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aid that ultimately reaches sectarian organizations is irrelevant as 
long as the aid reaches those organizations as the result of the truly 
private and independent choices of the individual beneficiaries.129  
Any advancement of religion would clearly be attributable to the in-
dividual, not to the government.130
Further addressing concerns under the first Agostini criterion, 
the Court in Mitchell v. Helms131 explored the argument that the mere 
possibility of government funding being diverted for religious pur-
poses is unconstitutional because it constitutes government indoctri-
nation of religion.  That case involved a challenge to Chapter 2 of the 
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 (“Chapter 
2”), a federally funded program through which educational materials 
and equipment are distributed to schools.132  Under Chapter 2, the 
federal government distributed funds to states, which then channeled 
them to state and local agencies that lent educational materials and 
equipment to public, parochial, and secular nonprofit private 
schools.133  The Court was split on its analysis of the divertibility ar-
gument.  Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality, and joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, argued that, 
because the diversion of funds could not be attributed to government 
indoctrination, divertibility was irrelevant so long as the government’s 
intention was neutral and the aid was suitable for public schools 
(meaning it did not include religious content).134  Justice Thomas 
reasoned that the content of the aid was the true concern, not di-
vertibility, by explaining that “the prohibition against the government 
providing impermissible content resolves the Establishment Clause 
concerns that exist if aid is actually diverted to religious uses.”135
The majority of the Court in Mitchell did not agree with the plu-
rality opinion, particularly the plurality’s view that the Court should 
not inquire into potential safeguards against such divertibility.136  Jus-
tice O’Connor, writing a concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer, 
rejected the idea that actual diversion of funding by religious organi-
mitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children enrolled in religious schools 
based on the neutrality in determining the recipients of the aid and the true private 
choice of allowing those recipients to decide where to direct the aid)). 
 129 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651 (citing Mueller, 474 U.S. at 490–91). 
 130 Id. at 652. 
 131 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 132 Id. at 801–02. 
 133 Id. at 802. 
 134 Id. at 820. 
 135 Id. at 822. 
 136 Id. at 837–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 903 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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zations is always constitutionally permissible.137  O’Connor argued 
that the plurality’s acceptance of actual diversion of federal funds for 
religious purposes conflicts with existing Supreme Court precedent138 
and that such precedent “demonstrate[s] that we have long been 
concerned that secular government aid not be diverted to the ad-
vancement of religion.”139  O’Connor further posited that the disposi-
tive issue is whether there is merely the potential for divertibility of 
funds for religious use or actual diversion of funds for religious use.140  
In order to make this determination, O’Connor said that good faith 
should be presumed in the absence of evidence of actual diversion 
and that pervasive monitoring should be abandoned so as not to lead 
to excessive entanglement.141  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor ex-
plained that there should not be an absolute rule against potential 
divertibility when the government aid consists of “instructional mate-
rials and equipment,”142 but distinguished the concerns raised by po-
tential divertibility of aid in the form of cash.  She supported this dis-
tinction by explaining that “the most important reason for according 
special treatment to direct money grants is that this form of aid falls 
precariously close to the original object of the Establishment Clause’s 
prohibition.”143
Justice Souter, writing a dissenting opinion in Mitchell, joined by 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, argued that the possibility of divertibil-
ity should render a program unconstitutional unless appropriate sa-
feguards are in place to ensure that diversion does not ensue.144
Determining whether Fugitive Safe Surrender has the effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion requires examination of the federal 
funding for the program under the Agostini criteria.145  Therefore, the 
first question under the first Agostini criterion is whether the govern-
ment aid for Fugitive Safe Surrender results in government indoctri-
nation, or whether any indoctrination that may occur could be at-
 137 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 138 Justice O’Connor explained that prior cases have shown that the Court has al-
ways been concerned about actual diversion of funds for sectarian purposes.  Id. (cit-
ing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226–27 (1997); Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 
1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968)). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 855–57. 
 141 Id. at 857–60. 
 142 Id. at 856. 
 143 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 856. 
 144 Id. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 145 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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tributed to the government.146  The funding is provided to the U.S. 
Marshals Service in the city implementing the program and is used 
for preparing and implementing the program.147  Ultimately, the fu-
gitives are the beneficiaries, and while no fugitive is actually denied 
participation because of his or her religion or lack thereof, fugitives 
who are unwilling to go to church are constructively denied participa-
tion.  Therefore, the aid is not provided neutrally because it does fa-
vor one group over another.  Peter Elliot’s own comments indicate 
that fugitives will be motivated to surrender because they trust their 
ministers.148  But this trust would not exist between Jews, Muslims, 
atheists, or agnostics and the ministers at these churches. 
Furthermore, there is no private choice involved with this pro-
gram because the aid never passes through the hands, literally or fi-
guratively, of the fugitives before finding its way to the churches.149  
Therefore, the fugitives are not presented the opportunity to choose 
whether the funding ultimately goes to sectarian or secular organiza-
tions.  The choice is made for these fugitives that if they want to ben-
efit from the governmental aid they must do so at church.  Private 
choice itself is not a constitutional requirement, but it is an important 
factor that the Court considers in its neutrality analysis.150  While the 
Supreme Court has indicated that disproportionate use of funding is 
irrelevant for determining neutrality,151 it has done so in the context 
of funding that was directed by the private choice of the beneficiar-
ies.152 Therefore, the disproportionate use of the governmental aid by 
Christians that is likely to result from Fugitive Safe Surrender is a ma-
jor concern. 
Turning to the issue of divertibility, the lack of uniformity by the 
Supreme Court is apparent.  Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion indi-
cated that divertibility is irrelevant as long as the government’s intent 
is neutral and the content is permissible,153 but this contention can-
not apply to the current program.  The permissible content require-
ment can only apply to government aid that is not in the form of 
 146 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809. 
 147 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007). 
 148 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 149 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c). 
 150 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810. 
 151 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993); see also 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651 (2002) (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U.S. 388, 490–91 (1983)). 
 152 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13–14; see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651 (citing Mueller, 463 
U.S. at 490–91). 
 153 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802. 
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money.  Indeed, Justice Thomas’s discussion that diversion cannot be 
an issue so long as the content of the aid is not religious involved only 
cases in which the aid was not in the form of money.154  Furthermore, 
Justice O’Connor explained that divertibility would be more discon-
certing when the aid is in the form of cash.155  The federal aid here 
consists of monetary aid, not aid such as instructional materials and 
equipment.  This distinction is crucial because aid in the form of in-
structional materials and equipment could not be diverted for reli-
gious purposes if the content is permissible.  However, funding in the 
form of cash creates significant concerns because it can easily be di-
verted for sectarian use, thus advancing religion.  Therefore, Justice 
Thomas’s interpretation of the divertibility issue is inapplicable to the 
Fugitive Safe Surrender program. 
Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the divertibility issue provides 
that only evidence of actual diversion would make a program uncon-
stitutional and that, absent such evidence, there should be a pre-
sumption of good faith.156  The infancy of the Fugitive Safe Surrender 
program makes it difficult to discern whether there is actual diver-
sion.  Ordinarily, a presumption of good faith when the aid is in the 
form of cash is a risky proposition because of the heightened danger 
of divertibility.  However, in the present case, monetary aid is pro-
vided from the federal government to the U.S. Marshals Service in 
the state implementing the program.  The U.S. Marshals Service then 
uses the money to provide the necessary funds for the four-day pro-
gram.  Since the U.S. Marshals Service is a government agency with 
no religious affiliation, it is reasonable to presume that this agency 
will distribute the aid in good faith. 
Under Justice Souter’s formulation of the divertibility issue, Fu-
gitive Safe Surrender might be unconstitutional because no safe-
guards are implemented to ensure that actual diversion does not oc-
cur.157  However, the main safeguard is the fact that the aid is indirect, 
first passing through the U.S. Marshals Service before it is provided to 
the church.158  This safeguard ought to be sufficient because, as a 
 154 Id.; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4; Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 487–90 (1986). 
 155 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 856 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 156 See id. at 855–57. 
 157 See id. at 908 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining his concern about divertibility 
when no safeguards are in place to protect against actual diversion); see also supra 
Part II.B (the description of the Fugitive Safe Surrender programs in Cleveland and 
Phoenix notably did not mention the inclusion of any safeguards to ensure that 
funds were not diverted for religious purposes). 
 158 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007). 
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neutral government agency, it is unnecessary to monitor the U.S. 
Marshals Service to ensure that no funds are provided for sectarian 
use. 
b. Defining Recipients by Reference to Religion 
Agostini’s second criterion significantly overlaps with the first be-
cause many of the same factors are applied and many of the same 
questions are asked.159  This criterion, like the first criterion, exam-
ines the neutrality and independent private choice involved, but to 
determine whether the government has defined the recipients of the 
funding by reference to religion.160  The Agostini Court explained that 
a crucial part of this inquiry is whether the aid “creat[es] a financial 
incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.”161  This financial in-
centive is not present “where the aid is allocated on the basis of neu-
tral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is 
made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a non-
discriminatory basis.”162  Furthermore, a truly private and independ-
ent choice would indicate that the government has not provided any 
incentive for the recipient of the funding to use it for religious pur-
poses.163  This ensures that the government has not defined the re-
cipients of the funding by reference to religion.164  While the Court in 
Mitchell explained that direct aid to sectarian organizations, which 
does not literally pass through the hands of the private beneficiary, 
can still be constitutional if it is directed to the organization of the 
beneficiary’s independent choosing, it does create more of a concern 
that the government aid will have the effect of advancing religion.165
When analyzing a government aid case to determine whether 
the government has defined the recipients of the aid by reference to 
religion, it is necessary to pinpoint the primary beneficiaries because 
these are the ones who must have access to the government aid in a 
neutral and unbiased fashion.166  To this end, the Court in Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills School District dealt with a challenge to a federal pro-
gram in which the government aided deaf children by providing sign-
 159 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814. 
 164 Id. at 813–14. 
 165 Id. at 813–14, 818–20 & n.8. 
 166 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1993). 
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language interpreters.167 James Zobrest, a deaf child aided by the pro-
gram, chose to enroll in a Roman Catholic high school, meaning that 
the government-provided interpreter would be interpreting religious 
teachings.168  The Court said that the program’s primary beneficiaries 
were “[d]isabled children, not sectarian schools.”169  Therefore, the 
Court upheld the program because the primary beneficiaries re-
ceived aid based on neutral criteria and because the aid was directed 
to the sectarian institutions at the behest of these primary beneficiar-
ies.170  Moreover, the Court determined that the number of interpret-
ers ultimately sent to religious schools was irrelevant.171
Under the second Agostini criterion, the same factors that were 
considered under the first—neutrality and private choice—are con-
sidered to determine whether Fugitive Safe Surrender defines its re-
cipients by reference to religion.172  This inquiry is predicated on 
whether the beneficiaries of the aid are presented with “incentive[s] 
to undertake religious indoctrination.”173  Based on the reasoning in 
Zobrest, it is important to recognize that the primary beneficiaries 
here are the fugitives.  Fugitive Safe Surrender provides incentives for 
the fugitives to undertake religious indoctrination in two ways: (1) 
sending them the message that the church is saving them and (2) 
merely getting them into church.  First, the implicit message to the 
fugitives that the church is saving them or giving them a second 
chance is likely to restore faith in fugitives who lost it or create faith 
in those who never found it.  The fact that this pro-religion, and 
more specifically pro-Christian, message is funded by the federal gov-
ernment is impermissible because it advances religion.  Second, the 
fact that the program occurs only in church provides an incentive for 
fugitives to go to the church, and their presence alone provides an 
opportunity for inculcation.  The federal aid advances religion by giv-
ing churches this opportunity.  While the government aid is allocated 
for the benefit of all fugitives regardless of religion and is provided 
on a nondiscriminatory basis, the program’s neutrality is significantly 
compromised by the fact that it takes place only inside a church.  
 167 Id. at 4. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 12. 
 170 Id. at 13–14. 
 171 See id.; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651–53 (2002) (ex-
plaining that the “amount of government aid channeled to religious institutions by 
individual aid recipients [is] not relevant to the constitutional inquiry”). 
 172 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 813 (2000). 
 173 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997). 
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Therefore, Fugitive Safe Surrender fails under the second Agostini cri-
terion. 
c. Excessive Entanglement 
Finally, Agostini’s third criterion, excessive government entan-
glement with religion, was originally the third prong under the Lemon 
test.174  The Agostini Court made this factor part of the analysis under 
the effect prong of the Lemon test because “cases discussing excessive 
entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as had 
our cases discussing primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon’s 
entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining 
a statute’s effect.”175  Excessive entanglement is discussed in the next 
section of this Comment as the third prong of the traditional Lemon 
test.176
The only conclusion to draw from analyzing Fugitive Safe Sur-
render under the effect prong is that it has the effect of advancing re-
ligion by getting people into church and creating the opportunity for 
the church to reach individuals it otherwise would not reach.  The 
program gets people into churches by running the program only at 
churches.  The Fugitive Safe Surrender Act uses the word “church” as 
the location for the program and even says that running the program 
in a church increases the likelihood of surrender because it provides 
an environment where fugitives feel safe and comfortable.177  More-
over, all of the programs completed thus far have used a church as 
the location for the program.178  This has the effect of advancing 
Christianity, even if that is not the intention, because many of these 
fugitives may be Jews, Muslims, or simply nonreligious individuals 
such as atheists and agnostics.  These fugitives must accept the expo-
sure to church or forego the opportunities provided by the program.  
It is more likely that they will accept the exposure to church because 
of the incentives provided in the form of favorable consideration.179  
This advances the church by giving ministers the chance to talk to 
people they otherwise could not reach.  In fact, in the Cleveland pilot 
program, ministers acted as advocates for the fugitives who turned 
 174 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 175 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232–33). 
 176 See infra Part III.A.3. 
 177 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007). 
 178 See, e.g., Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release, supra note 5; Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ 
Press Release, supra note 60; Fugitive Safe Surrender: Overview, supra note 2. 
 179 See Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ, supra note 27. 
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themselves in.180  In addition, the fact that the church provides a sec-
ond chance is likely to instill in these fugitives some sense of loyalty, 
gratitude, or even indebtedness toward the church.  Even though di-
vertibility is not a concern because the funding is provided to the U.S. 
Marshals Service, rather than the churches themselves, the second 
prong of the Lemon test is violated because the program has the effect 
of advancing religion.  Therefore, Fugitive Safe Surrender is uncon-
stitutional under the Lemon test. 
3. The Entanglement Prong 
The third prong of the Lemon test, the entanglement prong, re-
quires that the program “not foster ‘an excessive government entan-
glement with religion.’”181  Originally, government funding created 
an excessive and impermissible entanglement when the program in 
question required “comprehensive . . . and continuing state surveil-
lance.”182  State surveillance or pervasive monitoring would be neces-
sary if government funding could be used by the recipient to achieve 
sectarian goals.183  Therefore, the federal funding would require “vast 
governmental suppression, surveillance, or meddling in church af-
fairs”184 in order to ensure that federal funds are not used for sectar-
ian purposes.  The need for continuous observation in such a situa-
tion—to prevent sectarian use—constituted excessive entanglement 
according to the Court in Lemon.185
However, the Agostini Court modified the concept of excessive 
entanglement in several ways.  First, as mentioned previously, exces-
sive entanglement became the third criterion under the effect prong 
of the Lemon test and was no longer an independent prong.186  Sec-
ond, the Court became more lenient regarding permissible entan-
glement.187  The Court expressed this leniency by stating that “[n]ot 
all entanglements, of course, have the effect of advancing or inhibit-
ing religion.  Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and 
we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two.  
Entanglement must be ‘excessive’ before it runs afoul of the Estab-
 180 Russ, supra note 30. 
 181 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n 
of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 182 Id. at 619. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 185 Id. at 616, 620–21. 
 186 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997). 
 187 Id. at 233. 
GRUEN (FINAL) 12/1/2008  12:43:58 PM 
1556 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1533 
 
lishment Clause.”188  The Agostini Court continued by explaining that 
administrative cooperation and political divisiveness, which once 
were concerns under an excessive entanglement analysis, are no 
longer concerns for excessive entanglement.189  Finally, the Court re-
laxed the previous standard for pervasive monitoring by changing the 
prior presumption that public employees will inculcate religion in a 
sectarian environment and by adopting a presumption of good 
faith.190  The presumption that public employees will act in good faith 
eliminates the need for the state monitoring to be pervasive, which 
means that the entanglement is not excessive.191
Based on the current state of the excessive entanglement analysis 
used by the Supreme Court, the main question posed by Fugitive Safe 
Surrender is whether it would necessitate pervasive monitoring.192  
Even though the Agostini Court concluded that continuous state sur-
veillance is no longer necessary due to the presumption of good 
faith,193 this presumption was suggested in the context of aid that was 
not in the form of cash.194  Therefore, the content of the aid could be 
regulated, thus eliminating the need to monitor how the aid is used.  
Here, the aid is in the form of cash, but it is provided indirectly—first 
going through the U.S. Marshals Service and then to the churches.195  
This safeguard should be sufficient to ensure that, even if some moni-
toring is necessary, it does not reach the level of pervasive monitoring 
because the U.S. Marshals Service has no incentive to siphon off 
money for sectarian purposes.  Therefore, the government would not 
have to pervasively monitor the U.S. Marshals Service and its interac-
tion with participating churches in each city implementing the pro-
gram, which means there would be no excessive entanglement.  This 
does not, however, save Fugitive Safe Surrender from violating the 
Lemon test, because the program still has the effect of advancing relig-
ion.196
The analysis of Fugitive Safe Surrender under the Lemon test has 
demonstrated that the program is unconstitutional.  The first prong 
of the test—the purpose prong—is not violated because the program 
has the secular purpose of providing fugitives with a safe and com-
 188 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 189 Id. at 233–34. 
 190 Id. at 234. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(c) (West Supp. 2007). 
 196 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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fortable place to surrender.197  The second prong—the effect 
prong—is violated because Fugitive Safe Surrender advances religion 
merely by compelling fugitives to attend church.198  The program is 
also likely to advance religion by creating a sense of gratitude in the 
fugitives toward the church for providing a second chance.  The third 
prong—the excessive entanglement prong—is no longer an inde-
pendent prong of this test and, regardless, is not violated by Fugitive 
Safe Surrender because the U.S. Marshals Service should be entitled 
to a presumption of good faith.199  Even though this program has a 
secular purpose and does not require excessive entanglement, it fails 
the Lemon test because a violation of a single prong, in this case the 
effect prong, is a failure under the test.200
B. Endorsement Test 
The endorsement test was developed in Justice O’Connor’s con-
curring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.201 That case involved a challenge 
to Pawtucket, Rhode Island’s inclusion of a crèche, or nativity scene, 
in the city’s Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit organi-
zation located in the shopping district.202  Justice O’Connor ex-
plained that “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s 
standing in the political community.”203  She expressed her concern 
that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.  Disapproval sends the opposite 
message.”204  The question becomes whether an objective observer 
would perceive the state’s action as endorsement of a particular relig-
ion.205  Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the “objective observer” de-
scribes an individual with knowledge on the subject and the laws.206  
In addition, practices that endorse or disapprove of religion, “in real-
ity or public perception,”207 violate the endorsement test.  The endorse-
 197 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 198 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 199 See supra Part III.A.3. 
 200 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 201 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 202 Id. at 671. 
 203 Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 204 Id. at 688. 
 205 Id. at 690. 
 206 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000). 
 207 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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ment test has been embraced by the majority of the Supreme Court 
as a way to analyze Establishment Clause cases.208
Justice O’Connor also noted that mere government acknowl-
edgement of religion is not equivalent to government endorsement 
of religion.209  She explained that practices such as legislative 
prayers,210 printing of “In God We Trust” on money, and opening 
court sessions with “God save the United States and this honorable 
court” would constitute acceptable government acknowledgement of 
religion.211 Justice O’Connor supported this position by explaining 
that these practices constitute government acceptance of religion, 
rather than government endorsement, because of their lengthy his-
tory.212
The Agostini criteria discussed previously for determining wheth-
er government aid advances or inhibits religion are also used to de-
termine whether aid endorses or disapproves of religion under the 
endorsement test.213  To this end, the Supreme Court recognized that 
“no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private 
choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of 
the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries 
with it the imprimatur of government endorsement.”214
An “objective observer,” as formulated by Justice O’Connor, 
would recognize that Fugitive Safe Surrender offers a safe and com-
fortable environment for fugitives to surrender,215 a benefit that is not 
shared by fugitives of all religions.  Therefore, non-Christian and 
nonreligious fugitives would not feel as comfortable as Christian fugi-
tives surrendering in a church, a Christian place of worship.216  The 
 208 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301–10; see also McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 
545 U.S. 844, 865–66 (2005) (holding that displays of the Ten Commandments in 
courthouses violated the Establishment Clause). 
 209 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 210 Id. at 693 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). 
 214 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654–55 (2002). 
 215 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West Supp. 2007). 
 216 Though not the focus of this Comment, it is important to note that the Fugi-
tive Safe Surrender program may also violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which declares that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  While the program does not deny its benefits to any per-
son on its face, the effect of having the program in the church may deny the benefits 
to certain groups of people.  This program would most likely be subject to rational 
basis review, meaning that the state would need to show that the program has a ra-
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program is biased toward those who feel comfortable in a Christian 
institution.217  An objective observer would also recognize that the 
program offers “favorable consideration” to its participants.218  Provid-
ing favorable consideration—such as release without bail, quashing 
warrants, and sentencing benefits219—to fugitives willing to enter a 
church sends a message of government endorsing religion.  In par-
ticular, the government sends a message of endorsing Christianity, 
while disfavoring other religions, by using only churches for the pro-
gram rather than also using Muslim or Jewish sanctuaries.220  Fur-
thermore, the program creates the public perception of endorsing 
religion by involving members of the judiciary branch of government 
(state judges) and having them perform services inside a house of 
worship (the church).221  As Chief Justice Poritz of the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey warned, this eliminates the perception of neu-
trality in the judicial system and gives the appearance of judges work-
ing for law enforcement.222  It also creates the appearance that the 
judicial system is working for, or at least in conjunction with, religious 
houses of worship, and only Christian ones at that. 
Fugitive Safe Surrender further violates the endorsement test 
because, under Agostini, the federal aid provided for the program 
creates the perception of endorsing religion.223  As analyzed previ-
tional basis to a legitimate state purpose.  See generally Ry. Express v. New York, 336 
U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
 217 Jon Levine and Richard Moreland, psychology professors at the University of 
Pittsburgh, have conducted extensive psychological research on groups and behav-
iors in groups.  Their research indicates that out-group members feel uncomfortable 
when infiltrating groups and that conflict can exist when out-group members at-
tempt to infiltrate an existing group.  See Jon Levine & Richard Moreland, Progress in 
Small Group Research, in 41 ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 585 (1990).  This research 
suggests that non-Christians (out-group members to the Christian community) would 
feel uncomfortable infiltrating the Christian community, which leads to the conclu-
sion that these out-group members are less likely to take advantage of the Fugitive 
Safe Surrender program than Christian in-group members. 
 218 Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ, supra note 27. 
 219 Wagner, supra note 28; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26. 
 220 No mention is made in the act about using Jewish or Muslim places of worship 
for the program.  Only the word “church” is used.  42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1) (West 
Supp. 2007).  Additionally, the programs completed thus far have used Christian 
churches.  See U.S. Marshals Service, Fugitive Safe Surrender, http:// 
www.usmarshals.gov/safesurrender/expansion.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) 
(Listed on the left side of the home page are several links for descriptions of the cit-
ies in which the program has been instituted so far.  Descriptions of each individual 
program, including the Christian churches used by the program, are available 
through the link provided in the name of the individual city.). 
 221 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16989(a)(1); Graham, supra note 25. 
 222 Graham, supra note 25. 
 223 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). 
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ously, Fugitive Safe Surrender does not involve private choice and is 
constructively partisan toward religion, specifically Christianity.224  For 
the same reasons that the governmental aid advances religion, it also 
causes the reasonable observer to believe that government has en-
dorsed religion. 
An argument that Fugitive Safe Surrender merely acknowledges 
religion would be tenuous because this line of reasoning hinges on 
the practice having a lengthy history,225 and Fugitive Safe Surrender is 
new.  In addition, the practices accepted as mere acknowledgement 
of religion recognize the existence and observance of religion in 
general but do not endorse one particular religion over another.226  
Fugitive Safe Surrender, on the other hand, endorses one religion 
over others by providing its benefits primarily to individuals that feel 
the most comfortable in churches, presumably Christians.  This can-
not be explained as mere acknowledgement of religion.  Therefore, 
the Fugitive Safe Surrender program endorses religion and violates 
the Establishment Clause under the endorsement test. 
C. Coercion Test 
The coercion test was developed in Lee v. Weisman.227  Due to the 
coercive nature of the religious activity, the Lee Court invalidated a 
school’s practice of inviting a member of the clergy to deliver a non-
sectarian prayer at a commencement.228  The Court stressed that “at a 
minimum, the constitution guarantees that government may not co-
erce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”229  
The Court determined that, while attendance at the graduation 
ceremony was technically voluntary, the children’s only option to 
avoid the coercion was not to participate in the graduation ceremony, 
thus missing out on its benefits.230  Though an individual’s decision to 
participate in a particular religious exercise may be voluntary, courts 
have determined that compelled attendance at a ceremony or func-
tion in which exposure to religion is unavoidable will violate the co-
ercion test.231  Therefore, compelled or pressured exposure to gov-
 224 See supra Part III.A.2.a–c. 
 225 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 226 See id. 
 227 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 228 Id. at 590. 
 229 Id. at 587. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See id.; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (striking 
down a policy that authorizes a school’s student body to vote on whether an invoca-
tion would be delivered at its football games).  The Court in Santa Fe indicated that 
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ernment-sponsored religious activity presents the dangers that the Es-
tablishment Clause was intended to prevent.232
Neither the fact that prayer may be denominationally neutral nor 
the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary 
can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause . . . .  The Establishment Clause . . . does not depend upon 
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by 
the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether 
those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or 
not.233
Based on the analysis under the coercion test, Fugitive Safe Sur-
render is not voluntary because fugitives are compelled to attend the 
church in order to receive the benefits of the program.  As previously 
discussed, the program offers “favorable consideration,”234 which in-
cludes release without bail, quashing warrants, and sentencing bene-
fits.235  Therefore, fugitives who wish to avoid religious exposure 
could not participate in the program and could not attain these sub-
stantial benefits.  Furthermore, at the conclusion of both the Cleve-
land and Phoenix programs, the respective cities conducted a sweep 
to capture fugitives who chose not to participate in the program.236  
The fugitives captured by these sweeps did not receive the favorable 
consideration that the programs’ participants did.237  This further 
demonstrates the coercion because fugitives choosing to avoid reli-
gious exposure might be captured and receive harsher penalties than 
if they submitted to the religious exposure.  Like the children in Lee, 
fugitives have to deny themselves of the program’s substantial bene-
fits if they wish to avoid exposure to religion. 
while attendance at football games was technically voluntary, there was “immense so-
cial pressure” to attend and not attending to avoid exposure to religious worship 
would deny the individuals the benefits of being at the game. Id. at 311–12; Warner v. 
Orange County Dep’t of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1069 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
coerced participation in religion-tinged AA meetings violated the Establishment 
Clause); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 473–74 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that coerced 
participation in religion-tinged NA meetings violated the Establishment Clause). 
 232 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985) (invalidating a statute mandat-
ing a moment of silence in the public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1962) (striking down a school board policy 
that required daily recitation of a prayer in the state’s elementary and secondary 
schools). 
 233 Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. 
 234 Fugitive Safe Surrender: FAQ, supra note 27. 
 235 Wagner, supra note 28; Wagner & Collom, supra note 26. 
 236 Anderson, supra note 44; Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra note 60. 
 237 Anderson, supra note 44; Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra note 60. 
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Moreover, a finding of coercion does not require a finding of 
required participation in religious worship or activity; mere exposure 
or compelled presence at religious exercises will suffice to establish 
coercion.238  Participants of Fugitive Safe Surrender are coerced into 
exposure to religious practices, or at the very least, religious symbols, 
expressions, and connotations.  Some of the programs have further 
increased coercion by having ministers act as advocates for the fugi-
tives.239  Not only might fugitives of other religions or non-religious 
fugitives feel uncomfortable with ministers as their advocates, but if 
the fugitives are not Christians this could affect the ministers’ zeal in 
their role as advocates.  Fugitives in this position are more likely to 
submit to inculcation and are more susceptible to coercion because 
of their precarious situation.  This “uniquely susceptible” position 
further compromises the fugitives’ freedom to avoid religious expo-
sure.240  Individuals should not be “requir[ed] . . . to alienate them-
selves from the . . . community in order to avoid a religious prac-
tice.”241  Fugitive Safe Surrender violates the coercion test because 
fugitives must face coerced exposure to religion in order to partici-
pate in the program. 
D. Public Policy Concerns 
The Supreme Court has accorded some weight in its Establish-
ment Clause analysis to the notion that a program successfully ad-
dresses a pressing social need or public policy concern.242  For exam-
ple, the majority opinion in the Zelman decision focuses at length on 
the magnitude of the crisis in the Cleveland school system, and sug-
gests that the voucher system is an innovative and successful solution 
to the problem.243  Justice Souter, in his dissent in Zelman, implied 
 238 See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  The Court determined 
that a practice in which all cadets and midshipmen at military academies were re-
quired to attend Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish chapel services on Sundays violated 
the Establishment Clause because government may not require an individual to en-
gage in religious practices or to be present at religious exercises.  Id. at 284; see also 
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).  In Mellen, although the claim failed 
due to qualified immunity, the Court said that a practice in which students at a mili-
tary school were not required to pray but were required to be present at a mandatory 
supper prayer violated the Establishment Clause.  Mellen, 327 F.3d at 360. 
 239 Russ, supra note 30. 
 240 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371. 
 241 Id. at 372 n.9 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). 
 242 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). 
 243 Id. at 643–46 (majority opinion). 
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that the majority is in fact motivated by such public policy concerns 
in their decision: 
The record indicates that the schools are failing to serve their ob-
jective, and the vouchers in issue here are said to be needed to 
provide adequate alternatives to them.  If there were an excuse 
for giving short shrift to the Establishment Clause, it would prob-
ably apply here.  But there is no excuse.244
From a public policy perspective, Fugitive Safe Surrender does 
cure a pressing social need.  The success of the pilot program in 
Cleveland,245 as well as the success of the Phoenix program,246 demon-
strates the program’s ability to respond to the social concern of secur-
ing the capture of fugitives in a safe fashion and limiting crime.  
However, as Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in Zelman, there 
is no excuse for leniency with respect to the Establishment Clause, 
even for a truly beneficial purpose, and if violations are allowed be-
cause they help to cure societal ills, then even greater societal ills are 
created.247
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING FUGITIVE SAFE SURRENDER 
While violating some important principles in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, Fugitive Safe Surrender also presents an inno-
vative way to correct a societal concern.  Therefore, the program 
should not be abandoned but should be improved to make sure that 
its benefits are realized by society while separation of church and 
state is maintained. 
Rather than providing fugitives with this opportunity at church, 
Fugitive Safe Surrender should provide this opportunity at commu-
nity buildings with little or no religious affiliation and where all reli-
gious and irreligious people feel equally comfortable.  For example, 
the program would succeed in a public library or a local YMCA.  De-
spite actually being a “Young Men’s Christian Association,” and thus 
having some religious affiliation, a YMCA does not bear the same re-
ligious associations in a community as a church and is widely used by 
people of all religions and no religion at all. 
Offering the program in a more neutral community building 
eliminates Establishment Clause concerns.  No advancement of relig-
ion or excessive entanglement would ensue because this would not 
 244 Id. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 245 Aug. 8, 2005, DOJ Press Release, supra note 5. 
 246 Nov. 21, 2006, DOJ Press Release, supra note 60. 
 247 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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increase the number of people present in church and there could be 
no diversion of governmental funding for sectarian use.  There would 
be no endorsement of religion because a reasonable observer would 
not perceive the program as promoting one religion over another or 
as promoting religion generally.  This would also eliminate coercion 
because fugitives would not be forced to expose themselves to church 
in order to participate.  Meanwhile, the program would still provide a 
successful solution to an important problem because the intended 
benefits of the program—providing fugitives an environment to sur-
render where they feel safe and comfortable and keeping fugitive ar-
rests off the streets—would be accomplished. 
This alternative would still need to address the concern that the 
program may compromise the unbiased appearance of the judiciary 
and give the impression that judges are working for law enforce-
ment.248  This was one of the concerns expressed by former Chief Jus-
tice Poritz when she considered the program for New Jersey.249
Measures should be taken to ensure that fugitives are aware that 
the judges are not working for law enforcement, are completely neu-
tral, and are simply there to assist the fugitives.  For example, the in-
tense advertising campaign for the program could include assurances 
that the program is meant simply to move these proceedings to a 
more fugitive-friendly environment and that these judges are agree-
ing to move from the courthouse to the community center for that 
purpose.  In addition, at the proceedings the judges themselves could 
make sure to stress to the fugitives that they are not working for law 
enforcement or taking sides.  As long as the fugitives understand the 
distinct roles played by all parties involved, the program can flourish, 
and one of this country’s most vital principles—ensuring that Con-
gress and state legislatures do not make any law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion—can be securely protected. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While Fugitive Safe Surrender is a novel program that provides a 
benefit to society, it is vital to use caution when interaction between 
religion and government exists.  The government creates a slippery 
slope when it uses constitutionally suspect means to achieve a goal—
no matter how commendable the goal.  Where is the line drawn?  In 
the words of Thomas Jefferson: “History I believe furnishes no exam-
ple of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government. 
 248 Graham, supra note 25. 
 249 Id. 
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This marks the lowest grade of ignorance, of which their political as 
well as religious leaders will always avail themselves for their own pur-
pose.”250
 250 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron von Humboldt (month, day 1813), in 
THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 370, 370 (George Seldes ed., Citadel Press, 1983). 
